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CITE: 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 9 (2014)

A BRIDGE TO NOWHERE: EXPOSING COMPETITION AND PRICING
REGULATIONS THAT LEAD TO MISMANAGEMENT AND WASTE IN
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING
JIM R. MOYE*
“The Federal Government has an overriding obligation to American taxpayers.
It should perform its functions efficiently and effectively while ensuring that its
actions result in the best value for the taxpayers.”1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States government has a dubious history of grossly overpaying
for goods and services in its contracts. A recent United States Department of
Defense Inspector General Report found over $23 billion of wasted spending in
contracts from Government Fiscal Year 2013 alone.2 This was an increase of
almost $21 billion over the Inspector General’s findings in Government Fiscal
Year 2012.3 One of the most egregious findings in the report was that the
United States Army was purchasing coin-sized rubber wheels for over $1,600
each; the actual value of the individual parts was only $7.71 each.4
In a separate June 2013 report, the Department of Defense Inspector
General detailed further financial mismanagement.5 In the report, the Inspector
General determined that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), a subsidiary
agency within the Department of Defense, overpaid a defense contractor by
almost $14 million.6 Specifically, the report found that DLA Contracting
Officers failed to establish “fair and reasonable prices” for the parts in question
and failed to exercise proper contract oversight.7 Finally, the report suggested

* B.A., University of Southern California; J.D., The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law. The Author would like to dedicate this Article to his father and
mother, Jimmy R. Moye and Ulyesses Moye. They stand as a shining example of the
American Dream and the heights small business owners can reach with hard work and good
ideas.
The Author can be reached for comments, questions, and suggestions at
jim.r.moye@gmail.com.
1. Government Contracting Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 9755 (Mar. 4, 2009).
2. See Paul D. Shinkman, DoD Wastes Billions While Searching for Cuts, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT (July 15, 2013, 4:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/07/
15/pentagon-wastes-billions-on-contractors-and-lack-of-oversight-while-searching-for-cuts.
3. See id.
4. See id. (“Investigators also uncovered an instance in fiscal year 2011 where the
Army was purchasing coin-sized rubber roller wheels used to load cargo for the inflated price
of $1,678 each from Boeing. They are each valued at only $7.71.”).
5. See Michael Fabey, Pentagon IG Faults Spare Parts Purchases from Boeing,
AEROSPACE DAILY & DEF. REPORT (Oct. 4, 2013), available at http://awin.aviationweek.com
/portals/awin/cmsfiles/media/pdf/as_pdf/2013/10/04/asd_10_04_2013.txt.
6. See id.
7. See id. (“DLA Aviation guidance, the IG says, failed to require contracting officers
to obtain and review contractor purchase order histories when determining fair and reasonable
prices, or complete a subsequent review of pricing for spare parts after the parts were initially

(9)
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that if DLA did not renegotiate the contracts with the defense contractor, it
would continue to overpay for those parts long into the future.8
Federal government contracting, despite a sagging economy, is big
business. Based on figures quoted in a United States House of Representatives
Armed Services Committee Hearing, in Government Fiscal Year 2012,9 the
United States government had contractual obligations totaling over $515
billion.10 Those obligations totaled 14% of the total U.S. budget for that
year.11 The Department of Defense alone accounted for over $360 billion
worth of “federal contracts, which was more than all other [federal] agencies
combined.”12
The federal procurement system is heavily regulated, and with such intense
scrutiny, it leads one to this question: how does the government substantially
overpay time and time again for goods and services? While there could be a
number of reasons for the waste and mismanagement described above, there are
three intertwined issues that seem to have the greatest impact. Specifically,
these issues center around the government’s inability to (1) create competition
among a qualified pool of companies for contracts, (2) ensure that the bids from
these companies reflect that competition, and (3) negotiate a final price that is
reasonable. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, all government contracts
must have overall competition, adequate price competition, and a “fair and
reasonable price.”13 As shown in the instances above, the regulations seem to
consistently fail to adequately protect taxpayers from overpayment snafus.
Seemingly, the government’s contracting regulations are not in sync with
the commercial market, make little sense, and lead to bad contract awards. The
average American should be alarmed at this trend, as the government’s inability
to properly price and its tendency to overpay for items have been an issue since
the early 1980s, and its current financial austerity measures do not lend
themselves to such extensive waste. This Article will examine the controlling
competition and price determination regulations and analyze them using a
common sense approach. Section II examines the overall competition process
for federal contracts. Section III discusses whether the competition results in
adequate prices. Section IV outlines whether the successful price offer from a
competition has a fair and reasonable price. Section V notes the problems with
each of these provisions. Section VI provides various policy recommendations
that will increase competition, create prices reflective of that competition, and
result in fair and reasonable contract award prices. These changes would better
placed on long-term contracts, as allowed by the contract.”).
8. See id. (“If prices are not corrected, IG says, DLA Aviation will continue to overpay
on future sole-source spare parts procured from Boeing on the contracts cited in the report.”).
9. The United States Government 2012 Fiscal Year is October 1, 2011 through
September 30, 2012. See 31 U.S.C. § 1102 (2012).
10. See Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go from Here?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Twenty-five
Years of Acquisition Reform].
11. See id. (statement of Moshe Schwartz, Specialist in Defense Acquisition Policy,
Congressional Research Service).
12. See id.
13. See 48 C.F.R. § 15.402 (2009).
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ensure the best value for the government and protect taxpayers. This Article
concludes that these regulations are poorly written, lead to bad government
contracts and embarrassing newspaper headlines, and fail to serve the greater
good.
II. OVERALL COMPETITION REQUIREMENTS
To better understand the depth and range of the fair and reasonable price
issue, one must first understand who may submit offers and the process the
federal government utilizes to accept offers to provide goods and services.
Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), there are only three ways in
which procurements may be conducted.14 According to the regulations, offers
are generated through full and open competition,15 through full and open
competition after the exclusion of sources,16 and under listed statutory
authority.17 Full and open competition “when used with respect to a contract
action, means that all responsible sources are permitted to compete.”18
Examples of full and open competition include sealed bids, competitive
proposals, and a combination of competitive procedures.19 A practical example
of full and open competition would be the General Services Administration
releasing a Request for Proposal to provide property management services at a
government installation and inviting all interested facilities management
companies to submit timely and appropriate proposals.
Under the requirements for full and open competition after the exclusion of
sources, the government may exclude companies from submitting offers on a
specific procurement if doing so would, among other things, increase or
maintain competition, be in the interest of the national defense, or satisfy
projected needs based on a history of high demand.20 It is important to note
that the authority to exclude sources is vested with the head of a federal agency,

14. See id. §§ 6.000–603.
15. See id. § 6.102.
16. See id. § 6.202.
17. See id. § 6.302.
18. Id. § 2.101 (2013).
19. See id. § 6.102. This provision calls for sealed bids, competitive proposals, and
specialized proposal processes for specified situations. See id.
20. Id. § 6.202. The six reasons for excluding sources from a procurement are to:
(1) Increase or maintain competition and likely result in reduced overall costs for
the acquisition, or for any anticipated acquisition;
(2) Be in the interest of national defense in having a facility (or a producer,
manufacturer, or other supplier) available for furnishing the supplies or services in
case of a national emergency or industrial mobilization;
(3) Be in the interest of national defense in establishing or maintaining an essential
engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational
or other nonprofit institution or a federally funded research and development
center;
(4) Ensure the continuous availability of a reliable source of supplies or services;
(5) Satisfy projected needs based on a history of high demand; or
(6) Satisfy a critical need for medical, safety, or emergency supplies.
Id.
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not with procurement or contracts professionals.21 The decision to exclude
sources must be in writing and signed by the agency head.22 A practical
example of full and open competition after exclusion of sources is when the
federal government releases a Request for Proposal and limits which companies
may participate to those that already provide a specific service to the federal
government because the costs of initiating service would be inconsistent with
the budget and timeline of the government’s acquisition plan.
Finally, the regulations specifically define when non-competitive processes
may be utilized to receive offers.23 Failure to use full and open competition is
strictly prohibited by law, except in certain specifically defined situations.24
These instances include, but are not limited to, where there is: only one
responsible offeror, and the agency’s requirements cannot be satisfied
elsewhere;25 unusual and compelling urgency;26 statutory authorization or
requirements;27 national security interests;28 and a public interest.29 Each of
the listed reasons has its own applications and limitations, which are generally
spelled out in the individual provisions.30 A particularly infamous example of
non-competitive processes is the sole source contract, which occurs when there
is only one offeror for the contract.
III. IS THERE ADEQUATE PRICE COMPETITION?
After creating overall competition, the government verifies whether there
was adequate price competition. Adequate price competition can be achieved in
three ways.
The first is when two responsible offerors, competing
independently, submit priced offers that meet the government’s express
21. See id. § 6.202(b)(1).
22. See id.
23. See id. §§ 6.300–305.
24. See id.
25. See id. § 6.302-1(a)(2) (“When the supplies or services required by the agency are
available from only one responsible source, or, for DOD, NASA, and the Coast Guard, from
only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other type of supplies or services
will satisfy agency requirements, full and open competition need not be provided for.”).
26. See id. § 6.302-2(a)(2) (“When the agency’s need for the supplies or services is of
such an unusual and compelling urgency that the Government would be seriously injured
unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or
proposals, full and open competition need not be provided for.”). The regulation also states
that this provision applies if there is “unusual and compelling urgency preclud[ing] full and
open competition, and [] delay in award of a contract would result in serious injury . . . to the
Government.” Id.
27. See id. § 6.302-5(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when
(i) A statute expressly authorizes or requires that the acquisition be made through another
agency or from a specified source, or (ii) the agency’s need is for a brand name commercial
item for authorized resale.”).
28. See id. § 6.302-6(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when
the disclosure of the agency’s needs would compromise the national security unless the
agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals.”).
29. See id. § 6.302-7(a)(2) (“Full and open competition need not be provided for when
the agency head determines that it is not in the public interest in the particular acquisition
concerned.”).
30. See generally id. § 6.302.
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requirements.31 The second is when there is an expectation that two
responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit priced offers
meeting the government’s express requirements, but only one submits an
offer.32 The last way is when price analysis clearly demonstrates that the price
is reasonable based on current or recent prices for the same or similar items,
once the price has been adjusted to reflect changes in market conditions,
economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under contracts that
resulted from adequate price competition.33
The first definition of adequate price competition focuses on comparing the
offers received. First, the government verifies that there are two independent
companies, deemed to be responsible as defined in FAR,34 that submitted offers
to provide goods or services. Next, the government awards the resulting
contract to one of the companies, and price is a significant factor in the award.35
Finally, the government makes a finding that the successful offeror’s price is
not unreasonable.36
So what would this look like in an actual federal procurement? Assume
that PayneCo and Nahraf are long time federal contractors. They both submit

31. See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(i). The provision reads as follows:
Two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, submit priced offers
that satisfy the Government’s expressed requirement and if—
(A) Award will be made to the offeror whose proposal represents the best
value where price is a substantial factor in source selection; and
(B) There is no finding that the price of the otherwise successful offeror is
unreasonable. Any finding that the price is unreasonable must be supported by
a statement of the facts and approved at a level above the contracting
officer . . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
32. See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii). The provision states:
There was a reasonable expectation, based on market research or other assessment,
that two or more responsible offerors, competing independently, would submit
priced offers in response to the solicitation’s expressed requirement, even though
only one offer is received from a responsible offeror and if—
(A) Based on the offer received, the contracting officer can reasonably
conclude that the offer was submitted with the expectation of
competition, e.g., circumstances indicate that—
(1) The offeror believed that at least one other offeror was capable of
submitting a meaningful offer; and
(2) The offeror had no reason to believe that other potential offerors did
not intend to submit an offer; and
(B) The determination that the proposed price is based on adequate price
competition and is reasonable has been approved at a level above the
contracting officer . . . .
Id.
33. See generally §id. 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii). The provision reads:
Price analysis clearly demonstrates that the proposed price is reasonable in
comparison with current or recent prices for the same or similar items, adjusted to
reflect changes in market conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and
conditions under contracts that resulted from adequate price competition.
Id.
34. See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(i).
35. See id.
36. See id.
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offers to provide office supplies to the United States Department of Agriculture.
Both offers meet the government’s requirements. Ultimately, the government
chooses PayneCo’s offer because PayneCo has a commercial relationship with
an office supply corporation and its price was lower by 2.5%. In addition, there
is nothing in the competition to make the government believe that PayneCo’s
price is not reasonable. Therefore, PayneCo’s successful offer is based on
adequate price competition.
The second definition of adequate price competition centers on
expectations. Specifically, the federal government conducts market research
and uses past history to develop its requirements.37 The government then
releases a solicitation for goods and services, expecting at least two
independent, responsible companies would submit offers. Instead, only one
offer is received; the sole offeror believes that other responsible companies
were capable of submitting and would submit offers. Finally, agency
executives above the Contracting Officer approve the award.
For example, the government conducts market research and, based on that
research, believes that at least five companies will submit proposals to provide
said service. The government releases a Request for Proposal to provide
staffing services. Argonis Company, who is deemed responsible, is the only
company that submits a proposal. Argonis Company had no inside knowledge
of its competitors’ intentions, nor did it see any business-related reason not to
submit a proposal. The Contracting Officer, in the interest of time,
recommended award to Argonis Company, and received approval from the
Secretary of Agriculture. Therefore, Argonis Company’s proposal would be
deemed to be based on adequate price competition.
The third definition of adequate price competition looks only at price
analysis. Specifically, the government conducts a price analysis of an offer and
finds that the proposal price is reasonable because it is consistent with other
similar procurements once it is “adjusted to reflect changes in market
conditions, economic conditions, quantities, or terms and conditions under
contracts that resulted from adequate price competition.”38 This definition
would seem to be most appropriate for a non-competitive procurement, as it
makes no reference to multiple offerors.
The following example shows how price competition can be achieved
through the third definition. Assume that the Department of Defense issues a
sole source contract to Darby Limited to provide storage containers to forward
bases in Afghanistan. Darby Limited submitted an offer to provide the
containers for a two-year period. The contract-award price was consistent with
other contracts awarded to this company in Iraq and carried the same terms and
conditions as the Iraq contract. The Contracting Officer completed a price
analysis of Darby Limited’s offer and found there was adequate price
competition based on the similarity of the product, price, and contract terms.

37. See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii).
38. See id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii).
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IV. THE FAIR AND REASONABLE PRICE RULE
After assessing overall competition and determining whether there is
adequate price competition, FAR requires the federal government to purchase
supplies and services from responsible sources at “fair and reasonable prices.”39
Under FAR, the government establishes fair and reasonable pricing through
three different means.40 To meet this standard, the Contracting Officer must
obtain one of the following: (1) certified cost or pricing data, along with data
other than certified cost or pricing data; (2) data other than certified cost or
pricing data; or (3) “data necessary to establish a fair and reasonable price, but
not more data than is necessary.”41 The regulation provides that until the price
is found to be fair and reasonable, the government must continue requesting—
and the contractor must continue providing—data.42 Finally, the pricing

39. See generally id. § 15.402.
40. See id.
41. See id. § 15.402(a). The provision requires that Contracting Officers:
(a) Purchase supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable
prices. In establishing the reasonableness of the offered prices, the contracting
officer—
(1) Shall obtain certified cost or pricing data when required by 15.403-4, along
with data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary to establish a fair
and reasonable price; or
(2) When certified cost or pricing data are not required by 15.403-4, shall
obtain data other than certified cost or pricing data as necessary to establish a
fair and reasonable price, generally using the following order of preference in
determining the type of data required:
(i) No additional data from the offeror, if the price is based on adequate
price competition, except as provided by 15.403-3(b).
(ii) Data other than certified cost or pricing data such as—
(A) Data related to prices (e.g., established catalog or market prices,
sales to non-governmental and governmental entities), relying first
on data available within the Government; second, on data obtained
from sources other than the offeror; and, if necessary, on data
obtained from the offeror. When obtaining data from the offeror is
necessary, unless an exception under 15.403-1(b)(1) or (2) applies,
such data submitted by the offeror shall include, at a minimum,
appropriate data on the prices at which the same or similar items
have been sold previously, adequate for evaluating the
reasonableness of the price.
(B) Cost data to the extent necessary for the contracting officer to
determine a fair and reasonable price.
(3) Obtain the type and quantity of data necessary to establish a fair and
reasonable price, but not more data than is necessary. Requesting unnecessary
data can lead to increased proposal preparation costs, generally extend
acquisition lead time, and consume additional contractor and Government
resources. Use techniques such as, but not limited to, price analysis, cost
analysis, and/or cost realism analysis to establish a fair and reasonable price. If
a fair and reasonable price cannot be established by the contracting officer from
the analyses of the data obtained or submitted to date, the contracting officer
shall require the submission of additional data sufficient for the contracting
officer to support the determination of the fair and reasonable price.
Id.
42. See id.
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determinations must be separate and independent of any other contracts, and
may not use price reductions as an evaluation factor nor consider profits or
losses from other contracts.43
A deeper review of the fair and reasonable price regulations proves that it
is a complicated system. First, FAR defines certified cost or pricing data as
meaning “‘cost or pricing data’ that were required to be submitted in
accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and 15.403-5 and have been certified, or are
required to be certified, in accordance with 15.406-2.”44 The definition
continues: “[the] certification states that, to the best of the person’s knowledge
and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate, complete, and current as of a
date certain before contract award. Cost or pricing data are required to be
certified in certain procurements.”45
Second, FAR does not define “other than cost or pricing data.” Therefore,
the federal government and contractors are left to interpret the language on their
own. A plain language understanding of the definition is information that the
offeror has not certified that would assist a reasonable person in understanding
an offeror’s pricing methodology.
Third, the regulations require the submission of data necessary to establish
the fair and reasonable price. The provisions provide no timelines, definitions,
or guidance on how to submit such necessary data. Presumptively, the factfinding needed to establish a fair and reasonable price could continue
indefinitely.
The following example helps to better illustrate this issue of fact-finding
continuing indefinitely. The United States Department of Treasury announces
its intention to award a sole source contract to Reynolds LLC to provide highcapacity printers. The company submits a price proposal, which included
subcontractor and labor quotes, internal general and administrative information,
and a certificate of cost and pricing data. The Contracting Officer reviews the
information, but feels the submitted information was insufficient to establish the
price as fair and reasonable. The Contracting Officer requests additional
information from Reynolds LLC, which then submits a copy of a similar
contract with the United States Department of Commerce. The Contracting
Officer reviews the contract and still is unable to determine whether the price is
fair and reasonable. The acquisition plan calls for the contract to be fully
awarded within ninety days. Because of the Contracting Officer’s inability to
establish a fair and reasonable price, six months have elapsed and the contract is
still not awarded.

43. See id. § 15.402(b). The provision requires the government to “[p]rice each
contract separately and independently and not—(1) Use proposed price reductions under other
contracts as an evaluation factor; or (2) Consider losses or profits realized or anticipated under
other contracts.” Id.
44. Id. § 2.101.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
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V. AS CLEAR AS MUD: PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPETITION AND PRICING
REGULATIONS
“If someone were asked to devise a contracting system for the federal
government, it is inconceivable that one reasonable person or a committee of
reasonable people could come up with our current system.”46
If one reviews the overall competition, adequate price competition, and the
fair and reasonable provisions, it becomes abundantly clear that the system is
broken. On its face, the process is onerous and vague, and it fails to ensure that
the contracts awarded are of the best value for the government.
A. Problems with the Overall Competition Requirements
There are three succinct problems with regulations governing the overall
competition requirements. First, the regulations do not adequately define two of
the three provisions. While the definition of full and open competition seems to
be sufficient, the definitions for “full and open competition with excluded
sources” and “other than full and open competition” are inadequate. At first
glance, the title and the definition of full and open competition with excluded
sources are in conflict. It is not “full and open” if a qualified source is removed
from the competition, regardless of the rationale. The term “other than full and
open competition” is an apt title for the requirement, but the definitions in
support of the requirement are lacking and contain no real protection from
indiscretion.
Second, the full and open competition requirements refer to the
government’s obligation to utilize competitive procedures, but the provision
outlines solicitation types. Additionally, the list is not exhaustive. This
undoubtedly leads to a lack of standardization across federal agencies.
Finally, the reasons provided for excluding sources do not make sense.
Specifically, under the current language, the reasons provided include: to
increase or maintain competition to lead to reduced overall costs; to ensure the
continuous availability of a reliable source; to satisfy projected needs based on
high demand; and to satisfy a critical need for medical, safety, or emergency
supplies. These reasons, commercially and practically, are all the reasons to
expand competition. The government cannot actually increase or maintain
competition by restricting it, as it clearly states in the language. Restricting the
number of bidders would have the reverse effect and would ensure that the
government does not have sufficient sources to meet critical high demand for
medical, safety, or emergency supplies. To read these provisions out of context
would lead a reasonable reader to believe that they are the reasons for
supporting unrestricted full and open competition, not for exclusionary
46. Twenty-five Years of Acquisition Reform, supra note 10 (quoting J. RONALD FOX,
DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM 1960–2009: AN ELUSIVE GOAL (2011)). This quote has
been commonly used throughout the past two decades, with its first use attributed to James F.
Nagle. See JAMES F. NAGLE, A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 519 (2d ed.
1999).
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purposes.
B. Concerns with Adequate Price Competition Requirements
There are three distinct inconsistencies with the adequate price competition
provisions. First, in the primary definition of adequate price competition, it
states that such competition exists when, among other things, a proposed
contract award is based on best value and price was a significant factor. The
provision fails to define “significant factor.” Is it five, ten, or forty percent?
Does it even have to be a quantifiable percentage? Even though this
requirement exists, there is insufficient guidance provided in the regulation.
The lack of guidance ensures there will be no uniform application across
agencies and gives excessive discretion to the Contracting Officer.
The secondary definition of adequate price competition is even more
troubling. According to the regulation, if the government only receives one
offer—but had an expectation that it would receive two or more offers—there is
adequate price competition. This may occur if the sole offeror had an
expectation that there would be competition, had no reason to believe there
would not be competition, and anticipated that at least one other competitor
would submit an offer. Such a requirement makes little sense because there is
an underlying assumption that the offeror has inside information on other
offerors. In many instances, if a contractor had such intimate knowledge, there
would be a sufficient basis to question the integrity of the procurement.
Further, the requirement has the perverse consequence of giving a contractor’s
perception some measure of control over the government’s procurement.
Additionally, a key element of the provision centers on the government’s
market research or “other assessment.” There are no standards placed on the
market research or assessment. It places no timeframe, depth, or quality
provisions for this requirement. The regulation does not even require the
market research to be tied to the commodity or service area contemplated in the
procurement. In short, it gives uncomfortably wide discretion to the
Contracting Officer in this regard.
The third instance, whereby adequate price competition is established
strictly from a price analysis, is fatally flawed. It places no overall competition
requirement on the federal government. Further, it relies solely upon other,
similar contracts that have been adjusted for economic conditions, terms and
conditions, and other changes. This regulation is flawed on its face because it is
attempting to compare procurements in which the ultimate goods or services are
similar, but it compares nothing else. Further, it does not place a time limit on
the age of comparable procurement and, due to the lack of guidance, ensures
uneven administration of the provision. The provision lacks any controls and
provides no guidance to a Contracting Officer attempting to comply with the
requirements.
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C. Issues with the Fair and Reasonable Price Rule
There are four practical issues with the fair and reasonable price
regulations. As an initial matter, the regulations—and FAR for that matter—
fail to adequately define certified cost or pricing data. Certified cost or pricing
data is defined as “‘cost or pricing data’ that were required to be submitted in
accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and 15.403-5 and have been certified, or are
required to be certified, in accordance with 15.406-2.”47 There are neither
examples provided nor guidance given on what information is acceptable.
Additionally, there are no timeframes placed on the validity of the information
presented or reviewed and no quality standards about said information.
Second, in detailing the order of precedence of “other than cost or pricing
data,” the regulations state that government agencies must first rely on
information internally available; then on sources other than the offeror; and
finally on sources from the offeror, if necessary. This seems to force the
government to go through a circuitous route to validate the data. The
regulations provide no guidance on whether the government can utilize
information it already possesses. Further, it places no standard on the
applicability of the information based on the goods or services provided, on the
timeframe in which the information covers, or on other contextual matters that
may impact the quality of the data. To state that the offeror should be the last
source of information makes little sense, as they have generated the proposed
price and can best explain the rationale behind the price offer.
Finally, the regulations are vague as to the submission, compilation, and
review of data. For example, one regulation states that the Contracting Officer
shall “[o]btain the type and quantity of data necessary to establish a fair and
reasonable price, but not more data than is necessary.”48 Further, the provision
states that “[i]f a fair and reasonable price cannot be established by the
contracting officer from the analyses of the data obtained or submitted to date,
the contracting officer shall require the submission of additional data sufficient
for the contracting officer to support the determination of the fair and
reasonable price.”49 How is that language to be interpreted? It does not
adequately define what kind of data can be considered cost or pricing data. If a
contractor provided a quote for similar services to another government agency
or on the commercial market, would that be considered cost or pricing data?
What if those quotes were five years old and were for 20% less? Should the
cost or pricing data reflect the fully burdened cost of providing the services or
goods? In short, the provisions are poorly drafted and raise more questions than
they answer.

47. See 48 C.F.R. § 2.101.
48. Id. § 15.402(a)(3).
49. Id.
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VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
“Government inefficiency is no secret. Massive cost overruns and $500
hammers kill millions of trees in auditor reports, white papers and newspaper
series. In short, if you hadn’t heard, you weren’t paying attention.”50
The regulatory problems outlined above are significant, so it is essential
that policy recommendations be made in hopes of creating a more efficient
procurement system that does not end in embarrassing, bad procurement
decisions.
A. Overall Competition Requirements
There are three proposed regulatory changes to bolster overall competition
requirements. The underlying goals of these proposed changes are to ensure
consistency and to reinforce appropriate roles and responsibilities.
1.

Rewrite and Clarify Overall Competition Requirements

A more efficient way to administer the overall competition requirements
would be through a re-write of those requirements. The proposed provision,
which would replace title 48, sections 16.102, 16.202, and 16.302 of the Code
of Federal Regulations, would read:
Contract awards shall be achieved by full and open competition or
other than full and open competition. Full and open competition,
when used with respect to a contract action, means that all responsible
sources are permitted to compete. In support of full and open
competition, the Contracting Officer shall utilize the contracting
methods contained in FAR parts 13, 14, 15 and 17.
“Other than full competition” is any solicitation process in which
participating offerors are restricted in any way or in which there is no
solicitation process for purposes of contract award. Full and open
competition is the preferred method of contract-awarding for all
government procurements. “Other than full and open competition”
may only be utilized in urgent and compelling circumstances; in
support of classified missions for national security; in cases when a
law or statute requires it; or a situation in which there is only one or a
limited number of potential offerors. The Contracting Officer and
Head of the Contracting Activity will sign a Determination and
Finding providing the faces of the contract-awarding.
The
Determination and Finding will also state:

50. Editorial, FBI Takes Aim at John Wiley Price’s Role in Dallas County IT Deal,
DALLAS NEWS (Nov. 21, 2012, 10:44 PM), http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/editorials/
20121120-editorial-fbi-takes-aim-at-john-wiley-prices-role-in-dallas-county-it-deal.ece.
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that the factual circumstances support an award based on other
full and open competition,
that cost control methods will be utilized throughout the period
of performance,
that awarded contracts will only utilize the Firm Fixed Price
contract type, and
that quarterly performance and financial reports will be
submitted to the Inspector General of the awarding department.

There are a number of advantages to implementing the proposed
modification. First, it limits the categories of overall competition, which should
alleviate confusion. Second, the provision makes clear that full and open
competition is preferred as a way of forcing Contracting Officers to always at
least consider its utilization. Generally, if there is full and open competition, it
should result in the most commercially-practical contracts and pricing. Third,
the fact-finding that is required from the Contracting Officer should dissuade
the use of other than full and open competition and increase accountability. The
required quarterly reports to the Inspector General should make it easier to
monitor any contracts not awarded under full and open competition. Finally,
restricting the type of any contract awarded under other than full and open
competition is critical, as a Firm Fixed Price contract places all of the risk on
the contractor, which should provide some measure of protection to the federal
government.
B. Adequate Price Competition
1.

Remove the Ability to Find Adequate Price Competition Based on a Price
Analysis

As previously discussed, adequate price competition can be found strictly
by a price analysis.51 The most pressing policy recommendation is to remove
this requirement from the regulations. If overall competition cannot be
established in a procurement, it is improbable that a Contracting Officer could
find adequate price competition. Further, the lack of guidance and control over
this process, especially given that it is utilized in support of sole and single
source contracts, makes it a prime area for fraud and mismanagement. This
proposed change would also remove language that is vague and gives
unnecessary discretion to the Contracting Officer.
2.

Remove All References to Contractor Knowledge and Expectations

Currently, adequate price competition can be established when there is a
single offer, when—among other things—the contractor believed there would
be other offers, when other responsible offerors existed, and when other offerors

51. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(iii).
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were capable of submitting an offer.52 For purposes of competition, it is
irrelevant what an offeror believes, and there is no stated or evidentiary standard
by which to prove or disprove such beliefs. Additionally, the provision is selfserving to the successful offeror, because it is not unreasonable to assume that
any contractor placed in this position would act in its self-interest and attempt to
preserve its proposed contract award.
3.

Rewrite the Adequate Price Competition Provisions

There is no doubt that establishing adequate price competition is vital to
ensure good competition for the federal government within the commercial
marketplace and best value contract awards. The proposed revision, which
would replace title 48, section 16.403-1(c)(1)(i) through (iii) of the Code of
Federal Regulations, states:
Subsequent to the establishment of overall competition, the
Contracting Officer shall find there is adequate price competition.
Adequate price competition means, when used with respect to a
contract action, there are sufficient price offers to establish price
competition for a best value contract award. Adequate price
competition shall be established when three or more responsible,
independent offerors submit timely and responsive offers. If adequate
price competition cannot be established because there are less than
three responsible, independent offerors who submit timely and
responsive offers, the Contracting Officer shall conduct market
research to establish commercial reasonableness of the price offer.
The market research shall be consistent with the service or good being
procured, based on pricing within the last two calendar years, and
based on quantities consistent with the current procurement. A
Determination and Finding, signed by the Contracting Officer and the
Head of the Contracting Activity, shall be completed wherein it
clearly denotes the facts surrounding the procurement and the facts
ascertained from the market research.
C. Fair and Reasonable Prices
1.

Clarify the Definition of Certified Cost or Pricing Data

The definition of certified cost or pricing data, which is cited in title 48,
section 2.101, of the Code of Federal Regulations should be modified. A
modified version of the language is:
Certified cost or pricing data is defined as any prime or subcontract
offeror data, presented to the government or government prime
contractor, for the purpose of establishing the reasonableness of
offeror pricing. Certification is achieved by submission of written
52. See generally id. § 15.403-1(c)(1)(ii).
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confirmation by an authorized offeror representative stating:
“This certification states that, to the best of the person’s
knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate,
complete, and current as of a date certain before contract award.”
Examples of certified cost or pricing data include, but are not limited
to, supplier quotes, commercial catalogs, price lists, supplier
agreements, distribution agreements, labor records, general and
administrative accounting records, or other government contracts for
the same or similar goods or services. Certified cost or pricing data
shall be considered valid if the information provided has been active
and valid within the preceding three years.
Unlike the current definition, this language actually explains the
purpose of the data, gives concrete examples of the type of data that
can be utilized without making it unnecessarily restrictive, and places
reasonable limits on the data submitted.
2.

Clarify the Utilization of Certified Cost or Pricing Data or Other than Cost
or Pricing Data in Establishment of Fair and Reasonable Prices

The second policy recommendation is to modify the current language as it
relates to certified cost or pricing data in establishing fair and reasonable prices.
Proposed alternate language, which would modify title 48, section 15.402, of
the Code of Federal Regulations, would read:
Certified cost or pricing data shall be required for all prime or
subcontract offerors and all procurements above the simplified
acquisition threshold. The Contracting Officer may utilize data from
internal government sources, the commercial market, or other forms of
market research. Said external research must be for the same or
similar goods or services and have been active within the last three
years.
The Contracting Officer shall request only sufficient
information to establish the fair and reasonable nature of offers and no
more. Information submitted under these provisions shall be used
strictly to establish whether an offer(s) are fair and reasonable in price.
This recommendation is significant because it gives specific guidance and
examples of information that a Contracting Officer can consider in establishing
fair and reasonable prices. The current language is so vague that the proposed
level of specificity should assist in making better pricing decisions. Further, it
should help prospective offerors understand the types of information that they
will need to produce in conjunction with their offer. Overall, it should make the
process easier for all parties and yield faster, more efficient results.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The United States government has been subjected to bad government
contract awards and embarrassing newspaper headlines because of inadequate
competition and pricing procurement regulations. There is a general lack of
clarity; language that conflicts with its stated purpose creates unnecessary
loopholes, gives contractors impressions and contentions of control over
government procurements, and provides a general lack of direction and
guidance. The government could improve these regulations by re-writing them,
removing any references to beliefs and contentions, and writing better
definitions. The government is in a unique position, due to current austerity
measures, to actually improve the government contract system.
The
government can avoid the $500 hammers and $750 toilet seats, but it will be a
bridge to nowhere if the regulations are not revised.
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